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ABSTRACT.  The  exploitation  of  whales has spread  over  the centuries from coastal to international  waters, and from  pole to pole. Despite the  successive 
depletion  of  one species and  stock after another, not  until  the 20th century were attempts  instituted to regulate  the  industry  and  the catches at an 
international level. 
Agreements among the  whaling companies competing in  the  Antarctic  in the 19% were  closely  followed  by  intergovernmental agreements, culminating 
in  the 1946 International  Convention for the Regulation  of W i g ,  which  established  the  International Whaling Commission.  In 1975 the commission 
adopted  its  “new  management  procedure”  for  commercial  whaling, based on the wcept of maximum sustainable  yield.  A separate but related management 
procedure for subsistence  whaling operations was  subsequently  developed, largely because of the problems of the Alaskan bowhead  hunt. This gave 
greater weight  to the perceived  dependence  of the native  communities on the hunt than to the status of the whale  stock. 
The tensions  between the objectives  of the conservation  of the whale resources and the orderly development  of the whaling  industry  continue 
today.  Commercial  whaling is for  the  moment  prohibited  while  a  comprehensive  assessment  of st ck status and trends is undertaken, together  with 
the development  of  a  revised  management procedure. The  impact  of  recent legislative thinking  in  the  United  Nations Conference on the  Law  of 
the Sea, coastal state sovereignty, and  the  developing trend towards  the  precautionary principle of management has caused  profound  changes  in 
the interpretation and  application  of the 1946 convention  and  the  consequent  management  policies by which it is implemented. 
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RJkWMfi. L’exploitation des baleines  s’est  &endue,  au cours des sikles, depuis les eaux c6tibres jusqu’aux eaux intemationales, et d’un  @le B 
l’autre. Malgd 1’6puisement successif des e s e s  et des stocks, il fallut  attendre le XXc sikle pour que des essais soient entrepris afii de dglementer 
l’industrie et les prises au  niveau international. 
Les accords conclus dans les a n n k s  30 entre les soci6t6s  baleinibres  qui etaient en concurrence dans 1’Antarctique  ont 6t6 suivis de prbs par des 
accords intergouvernementaux,  pour aboutir en 1946 B la Convention internationale pour la rkglementation de la chasse B la baleine, qui  6tablit la 
Commission  baleinibre internationale (CBI). En 1975, la Commission  adopta  sa aouvelle procedure de gestionn pour la chasse commerciale B la 
baleine, fond&  sur le concept du rendement Quilibd maximal. Une procedure de gestion  connexe  mais distincte, conemant la chasse de subsistance 
a kt6 mise  au  point par la suite, en raison surtout des problbmes  de  la chasse B la baleine bodale en Alaska. Cette demibre procedure  accordait 
plus de poids B I’importance de la chasse  pour les communautes  indigbnes  qu’au  statut du stock baleinier. 
Les tensions entre les objectifs de conservation des ressources baleinibres et le developpmed 0 r d 0 ~ 6  de I’industrie  baleinibre  persistent encore 
de nos jours. La chasse commerciale est, pour I’instant, interdite pendant  qu’on entreprend une  Cvaluation en profondeur de l’etat et des tendances 
du stock, et qu’on revise la procedure de estion. Les retombees des discussions rkentes sur la Mgislation lors de la Confkrence des Nations  Unies 
sur le droit de la mer, la souverainet6 des !tat cbtiers, et la tendance croissante vers le principe de gestion pdventive, ont caud de profonds  change- 
ments dans l’interpretation  et dans l’application de la Convention de 1946, ainsi que dans les politiques de gestion dsultantes grace auxquelles elle 
est mise en application. 
Mots  cl6s:  aborigbne,  baleine bodale, conservation, exploitation, Commission  baleinibre internationale, gestion, rkglementation,  subsistance, chasse 
B la baleine 
Traduit pour le journal par Nesida Loyer. 
THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL  WHALING 
Records of the  hunting  of  whales are found  since the beginning 
of  history.  The  first  industry  that can be  identified  is  the  catching 
of  black right  whales by the Basques  in  the Bay  of  Biscay area 
of the  North  Atlantic,  which  dates from at least  as  early as the 
12th  century (Ellis, 1991). As these  stocks  were reduced, the 
whalers  were  forced  to  search farther afield, until  the  North 
American  coast was reached by the 16th century. British  and 
Dutch  vessels  expanded  the  hunt to the  Greenland, or bowhead, 
whale  in arctic waters in the 17th  century  (Jackson,  1978).  The 
next century saw the rise of the sperm whale fishery as a 
worldwide enterprise. The  American  whalers  from New 
England  predominated  in this phase  of  whaling,  with  British 
and other nationalities involved in the expansion from the 
Atlantic into the Pacific and Indian oceans (Berzin, 1972). 
Southern  and  northern  right  whales,  as  well  as  bowhead  whales, 
were all seriously  reduced by the  beginning of  the 20th  century, 
together  with  the  Pacific  gray  whales  migrating  close to the 
North American coast. Apart from the latter, these various 
fisheries  were  targeted on the  relatively  slow-swimming  species, 
which  usually  float  when killed. The operations were carried 
out from open boats under sai l  or  oars, initially using hand 
harpoons and lances, which  were  largely  replaced by darting 
guns and  bomb  lance guns in  the  second half of  the  19th  century 
(Mitchell et al., 1986).  Parallel  with  the  European-style  whaling, 
there was also a separate Japanese  coastal  fishery  using hand 
harpoons and, from 1675, a netting technique, mainly for 
humpback, right, and gray whales (Omura, 1984). 
The  advent  of  modem  whaling can be dated from  1864, when 
the  Norwegian  combination of an  explosive grenade harpoon 
fired from a cannon  mounted on a powered  catcher  boat  brought 
even the fastest  swimming  and largest whale species, such  as 
the blue, fin, and sei whales, within reach (Tldnnessen and 
Johnsen, 1982). This technology spread widely in the North 
Atlantic  whaling operations, so that the whales  within  reach of 
the  coastal  stations  were  depleted.  Whaling  along  Norwegian 
ines  was first attempted  in eastern Asia  in  1889  off  the  coast 
of Korea  (Risting,  1931).  The  hunt  spread farther afield  and 
eventually  extended to the rich and  productive  waters of the 
Antarctic. The first land  station  opened  on  South  Georgia  in 
1904,  and  there  followed a rapid  expansion  with  floating  factory 
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ships in sheltered harbours where the whales were flensed 
alongside and the blubber and flesh hoisted aboard. The 
restriction of a land  base  was  overcome in 1925 when  the first 
floating  factory  ship  with a stem slipway,  making  it  possible 
to haul  whales on deck for processing  even on the open seas, 
was brought into commission. Within five years there were 
6 shore stations, 41 British  and  Norwegian  factory ships, and 
232 whale  catchers  working in the  Antarctic (Jahn, 1937). The 
decline in the  industry after the 1930s was given a brief  respite 
by the 1939-45 war, but  reduction of  many  of the  major  whale 
stocks  in  these  oceans  continued  until a pause  in  all  commercial 
whaling  was  introduced  throughout  the  world for the  member 
nations  of  the  International  Whaling  Commission,  in  effect  from 
the 1986 whaling season. 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
During the entire history of whaling,  once the local  coastal 
stocks  were  exhausted,  the  catching  operations  were  conducted 
in the  international  areas  that  came to be known  as  the  high  seas, 
under a doctrine of freedom of access  that  can  only  be  limited 
by the consent of the  participant  states (Birnie, 1985). Whales 
are regarded  as a common  property resource, which  implies 
that  no  single  user  has a right  to the resource, nor  can  they 
prevent others from  sharing in its exploitation. But the  history 
of fisheries and  whaling  has  demonstrated  time  and  time  again 
that this has  led  to  over-exploitation of the resources. 
The origin of the  doctrines of the freedom of the seas  and 
common  property  resources go back  at  least to Roman  times. 
During  the  succeeding  centuries  states  made  use of  the  concepts 
to  strengthen  their  arguments  for  refuting  exclusive  fishing  rights 
claimed  by other countries and to allow  freedom of navigation. 
The 1931 Convention 
The first positive  step on an  international  level to regulate 
whaling  throughout  the  world,  and  particularly to bring order 
and  control  into  the  Antarctic  whale  fishery,  was  the  Convention 
for  the  Regulation  of  Whaling  signed  in  Geneva  in 1931 (League 
of  Nations Treaty Series, CLV, 349). It  did  not  come  into f rce 
until 16 January 1935, after  the  requisite  number of  ratifications 
had been received. The convention applied to all waters, 
including  both  the  high  seas  and  national  and territorial waters, 
but  was  only applicable to baleen  whales  and  provided 
exemptions  for  aboriginal  subsistence  whaling (see below).  The 
taking of right  whales,  calves or suckling  whales,  immature 
whales,  and  females  accompanied by calves or suckling  whales 
was prohibited.  Payments to gunners  and crews was to depend 
more on the size and  value of the  catch  than  the  sheer  numbers 
caught to encourage a preference for the larger animals  and 
protection of the smaller, immature  whales.  It  also  provided 
for  the  licensing  of  whaling  vessels  and  the  collection  of  statistics 
of the  catches. 
These measures had rather little effect on the Antarctic 
operations because not all the countries whaling in the area 
adhered to the convention, particularly Germany and Japan, 
which  were new entrants to the  Antarctic fishery. However, 
the convention did establish the principle of international 
regulation of a common  property resource in the  high seas. 
In particular, it gave a legal framework for the voluntary 
production  agreements  entered into by the whaling  companies 
after the gross over-production of oil  in  the 1930-3 1 Antarctic 
season. As a result of the uncontrolled  and great slaughter  that 
took  place  in  that  season,  more  oil  was  produced  than  there  was 
a market to consume, and Norway kept its fleet in port the 
following year. The whaling companies decided to try to 
stabilize  the  market by restricting the amount  of oil produced, 
but the power of such  voluntary  arrangements  between  com- 
mercial  enterprises  needed  the r enforcement of a formal  treaty 
to ensure concerted  government  action.  Nonetheless,  the 
whaling  companies  had  established a restricted  and later open 
season for  Antarctic  whaling,  when  the  whales  had  grown  fatter 
during  the  summer  feeding period, and  minimum  size  limits 
for blue  and  fin  whales,  both  measures  designed to encourage 
increased  output of oil per  whale. 
The 1937  Agreement 
Because the 1931 convention was not performing a useful 
function, a new International  Agreement for the  Regulation of 
Whaling was signed by nine nations,  including  Norway,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  Germany,  in 1937 (League of  Nations 
Treaty Series, XCX, 79). This  gave  complete  protection  to he 
depleted  stocks of right  and  gray  whales  and  set  minimum size 
limits for blue, fin, humpback,  and  sperm  whales,  as  well  as 
forbidding  the  capture of females  accompanied by calves. The 
Antarctic  pelagic  whaling  season  was  restricted  to three months 
from December  to  March  and large parts of the  world's  oceans 
north of 40"s latitude  were  closed  to  factory  ship  operations. 
An exception was  made  in  the  North  Pacific  as a concession 
to Japan, although  Japan  decided to stay  outside  the  agreement 
because  it  felt  that  its  newly  developed  whaling  industry  should 
not  be  restricted  in this way.  Enforcement of the  regulations 
was assisted by  the arrangements for flag  nations to appoint a 
government  inspector to each  factory ship. 
The 1937 agreement  applied to all  waters in  which  whaling 
was  prosecuted  by  factory  ships  and  whale catchers, and  govern- 
ments  were  required to record statistics  of  the vessels, catches, 
certain biological  information  concerning  the  whales,  and the 
quantities of the  various  products  obtained. 
The 1938  Protocol 
A further  international  conference  held  in 1938 adopted  some 
additional regulations as a protocol to the 1937 agreement 
(League  of  Nations  Treaty  Series,  CXCVI, 131). These  included 
a ban  on  taking  humpback  whales  in  the  Antarctic  because of 
the  depleted  state of the stocks  and  the  designation of a whale 
sanctuary in the  Pacific  sector of the  Antarctic  between 
longitudes 70"W and 160"W. 
The 1944 and 1945  Protocols 
A most  important  development  in 1944 was  the  decision  to  set 
an overall  catch  limit  in  the  Antarctic.  The  Whaling  Committee 
of the  International  Council for the  Exploration of the  Sea  had 
recommended  in 1938 that a limit  should  be  set on the total 
amount of oil produced. Such a move was not considered 
practicable at that time because of the size and number of 
competing  fleets  in the Antarctic  whale fishery. However, by 
1944 the situation had changed, since many of the whaling 
factory  ships had  been  sunk  during  the  war  and  it  was  possible 
to  set a maximum  catch  limit  well  below  the  pre-war  catch  level 
without  placing  unacceptable  restrictions on the  remaining  fleets. 
To simplify the system and not to discriminate between the 
companies  and  nations concerned, it was decided to use the 
Blue  Whale  Unit  (BWU) as the  governing criterion. This was 
based  on  the  oil  production  regulation  developed  by the  industry 
inthe193Osandmade1bluewhale=2fin=2?hhumpbacks= 
6 sei  whales.  The  first  limit  set for the  1946/47  Antarctic  season 
was  of  16 O00 BWU,  about  two-thirds of the average catch  in 
the pre-war years (United Nations Treaty Series, 148). 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR 
THE REGULATION OF WHALING, 1946 
The  culmination of the  pre-war efforts to protect  the  whale 
stocks  and  regulate the whaling  industry  came in 1946  when 
an International Whaling Conference was convened by the 
United  States  government  in  Washington, D.C., at the  end  of 
1946. The conference adopted a new convention, by which 
according to the Preamble: 
The Governments . . . 
Recognising  the  interest of the  nations  of the world  in  safe- 
guarding for future generations the great natural resources 
represented by the  whale  stocks; 
Considering  that the history of  whaling has seen  over-fishing 
of  one area after  another  and  of  one  species  of  whale after another 
to such  a  degree  that  it  is  essential  to  protect all species  of  whales 
from  further  over-fishing; 
Recognising that the whale  stocks are susceptible of natural 
increases  if  whaling  is  properly  regulated,  and  that  increases 
in  the size of  whale  stocks  will  permit  increases  in  the  number 
of whales  which  may be captured  without  endangering  these 
natural  resources; 
Recognising that it is in the common interest to achieve the 
optimum  level  of  whale  stocks as rapidly as possible  without 
causing  widespread  economic  and  nutritional  distress; 
Recognising  that in the  course of achieving  these  objectives, 
whaling  operations  should be confined  to  those  species  best  able 
to  sustain  exploitation  in order to  give  an  interval for recovery 
to  certain  species of whales now depleted in numbers; 
Desiring  to  establish  a  system  of  international  regulation for the 
whale fisheries to ensure proper  and  effective  conservation  and 
development of whale stocks on the basis of the principles 
embodied  in  the  provisions  of  the  International  Agreement for 
the  Regulation of Whaling,  signed  in  London  on  8th  June, 1937, 
and the protocols to that Agreement signed in London on 
24th June, 1938, and 26th November, 1945; 
. . . decided  to  conclude  a  convention to provide for the  proper 
conservation of  whale stocks and thus  make  possible  the  orderly 
development of the whaling industry [IWC, 1950:9-lo]. 
The  1946  convention  established the International  Whaling 
Commission (IWC), which  formulates  regulatory  measures  and 
is  responsible for their application. The convention  includes a 
Schedule of regulations, which are open to amendment by a 
three-quarters majority of the members of the commission 
voting.  These measures, among  other things, provide for the 
complete  protection  of  certain  species,  designate  specified  areas 
as  whale sanctuaries, set  limits on the maximum  numbers  of 
whales  that may be  taken  in  any  one  season,  prescribe  open  and 
closed  seasons  and areas for whaling,  set  limits  on the sizes of 
whales  that may  be killed, and  prohibit  the capture of suckling 
calves  and  female  whales  accompanied by calves.  There is also 
a requirement to compile  and  submit  catch reports and  other 
statistical  and  biological records. In addition, the  commission 
encourages, coordinates, and  funds  whale research, publishes 
the results of these  and other scientific research, and  promotes 
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studies  into  related  matters,  such as the humaneness  of the  killing 
operations. 
The  regulations first adopted  were  closely  modelled  on  the 
agreements  reached  among  the  whaling  nations i  the  pre-war 
years. They have been amended subsequently in light of 
changing circumstanw and  the  acquisition  of  better  knowledge. 
Whenever  changes are made to the  Schedule  provisions there 
is a 90-day  period before they  become effective, during  which 
any government  can  lodge  an  objection. If this occurs there is 
a further period of 90 days  during which  any  other  government 
can  also  lodge an objection, after which the amendment to the 
Schedule  becomes  binding  on all governments  that  have not 
objected. This escape  clause  was  designed to allow  governments 
not to be bound by regulations they considered detrimental 
to their own best national interests. It has meant that some 
conservation  measures  have  not  been  fully effective, or their 
enforcement  has  been deferred, but  it is doubtful if the 
convention  itself  could  have  been  approved  without  such an 
arrangement. 
The history of the  early  years of the IWC  was  not a good 
one  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  conservation  of  the  whale  stocks, 
particularly  those in the  Antarctic  (McHugh,  1974;  Macintosh, 
1965; Scarff, 1977). The overall quota system led to each 
whaling  operation  racing to take  the largest share of the  total 
catch permitted, because the convention  explicitly debars the 
commission  from  restricting  the  number o nationality  of  factory 
ships or land  stations or allocating  quotas to them  individually 
or in groups. In addition,  the  catch  limit  was  maintained  at far 
too high a level at the insistence of the whaling countries, 
reflecting  the  demands of  their  whaling  companies,  despite he 
obvious  decline  in  the  whale  stocks.  Because  agreement  could 
not  be  reached  outside the commission  on  national quotas, as 
a means of attempting to reduce  the  “Whaling  Olympics’’  that 
had  developed, the  Netherlands  and  Norway  withdrew  from  the 
commission  in  1959.  No  catch  limits  at  all  were  set for the  next 
two seasons, but finally an agreement was reached in 1962 
outside  the  commission  among  the  five  Antarctic  whaling  nations 
establishing  national  quotas as percentages of the  IWC  catch 
limit,  and  the  Netherlands  and  Norway  rejoined  the  commission. 
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES 
The first steps towards the development of science-based 
management  of  the  whaling  industry  began  as a result  of  the 
chaos  described  above  in  reaching a satisfactory  arrangement 
for the national shares of the total  catch limits for the Antarctic 
whale fishery. In 1961 the IWC  appointed a special  committee 
of three experts in  population  dynamics drawn from  countries 
not  engaged  in  pelagic  whaling  in the Antarctic.  They  were 
asked to make an independent  analysis  of  the  baleen  whale  stocks 
and appropriate recommendations to the commission. The 
Committee of Three - made  up of Dr. D.G. Chapman, of the 
United States, Mr. K.R. Allen, then of New Zealand, and 
Mr. S.J. Holt, from the United  Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization in  Rome - was  later  expanded  to Four by the 
addition of Dr. J. Gulland, of the United  Kingdom.  The  work 
of these experts brought into the  analysis of the whale  stocks 
the mathematical  methods  and  techniques  newly  developed for 
fisheries assessment. By cooperation  with  the IWC Scientific 
Committee  (made up  of  scientists  from the member nations), 
the  catch data and  biological  information  available  were 
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subjected  to  rigorous  analysis  to  determine  the siz  of  the  stocks 
and the  level of  yield  they  could  sustain  (Chapman et al., 1964). 
As a result of the  recommendations of  the special  committee, 
humpback  whales  were  given  complete  protection  south of the 
equator  and  blue  whales for most  of the area south  of 40”s in 
1963 (complete protection for blue whales in the Southern 
Hemisphere  came  into  effect in 1967). The commission 
expressed  its  intention of bringing  the  Antarctic  catch  limit  into 
line with the scientific  findings by 1964, but  having  regard for 
the interests of the  consumers of the whale  products  and the 
industry  itself.  In  the event, those  countries  engaged  in  whaling 
could  not  see  their  way to accept  such a drastic reduction of 
the 1963/64 catch  limit as the  scientific  evidence  indicated,  while 
the non-whaling countries were unable to vote for any limit 
substantially higher than warranted by this evidence (IWC, 
1966a). Because of the  impossible  situation  that  had  developed, 
a special  meeting  of the commission  was  held  in  May 1965 to 
resolve  the  problem of the Antarctic  quotas.  It was agreed  that 
over a three-year  period  the  catch  limit would be reduced to 
below the sustainable  yield of the stocks  estimated  according 
to the best scientific advice available (IWC, 1966~). 
Unfortunately, there was a delay  in  the  full  implementation of 
this decision  due to a downward  revision  of  the  sustainable  yields 
calculated by the  scientists  because  of a new understanding of 
age  determination  in  the  whales  and  their lif  spans.  Finally  the 
catch  limits  were  set by individual  species rather than by  Blue 
Whale Units in 1972. 
This year, 1972, also finally  saw  the  implementation  of the 
International  Observer  Scheme,  whereby observers appointed 
by the  commission  and  reporting  directly to it  were  stationed 
at  the  whaling  operations of the member  states to confirm their 
compliance  with the agreed  whaling  regulations  (IWC, 1974). 
These  arrangements  were  set up through  formal  agreements 
among governments with similar areas of interest, so that 
observer  schemes  came into operation for the  Southern 
Hemisphere  pelagic  whale fishery, Southern  Hemisphere  land 
stations, North Atlantic land stations, North Pacific pelagic 
whaling,  and  North  Pacific  land  stations.  Because the whaling 
nations  were  the  only  ones; in general, who  were  prepared  to 
finance  these  schemes,  it was necessary for the observers to 
be nominated and exchanged on a bilateral basis among the 
active parties. Thus  Japan  and  the  U.S.S.R.  exchanged 
observers on their North  Pacific  and  Antarctic  factory fleets; 
Australia and  South  Africa  exchanged observers at their land 
stations; and  Canada,  Iceland,  Norway,  and  Spain  exchanged 
observers in  the  North  Atlantic  area;  however,  the  U.S.  did  send 
observers to the  Japanese  land stations. 
The 1975 Procedure 
In 1974 the  IWC  adopted a formal  management  procedure  in 
partial  reaction to calls for a ten-year  moratorium on commercial 
whaling,  as  advocated by the  United  Nations  Conference on 
the  Human  Environment  held  in  Stockholm  two years earlier. 
This management regime, often and  confusingly  called  the  New 
Management Procedure, was designed to regulate the catches 
from  each  stock on an  individual basis, rather than by some 
blanket  action. The procedure  was  based on the  concept of the 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The theory behind this 
approach is that  through  the  interplay of the natural  responses 
for a stock  to increase when its numbers are reduced, at each 
particular size of stock  there is a certain surplus of recruitment 
over  natural  mortality.  This low  when the stock is at or close 
to  its initial, unexploited  level  and  also at very  low  stock  levels, 
and  it increases  to a maximum  at  some  intermediate  point  some- 
where  around 5040% of the original abundance. This yield 
represents a harvest  that  can  be  taken for an indefinite  time 
without further depleting  the  stock.  The  biological  mechanisms 
involved  in  the  enhanced rate of recruitment  probably  include 
a reduction in the  age  at  sexual  maturity  and  an  increase in the 
pregnancy  and  survival  rates.  These are possibly  brought  about 
by improved  feeding  conditions  for  the  survivors  in  populations 
reduced  by  hunting,  which  among  other  things  result  in  increased 
growth rates and ovulation frequencies (Gambell, 1973). 
Under this new management procedure, stocks  were to be 
classified on the  advice of  the Scientific  Committee  into  one 
of three categories  according  to  their  abundance  relative  to the 
level  providing  the  MSY. A “sustained  management stock” was 
between 10% below  and 20% above the MSY level. Catches 
were to be  set  at  not  more  than 9 0 %  (to give  some  margin of 
safety)  of  the  MSY  for  these stocks, with a progressive  reduction 
for any  stocks  estimated  to lie between  the MSY level  and 10% 
below  that level. A similar level of catch of 90 % of the  MSY, 
with  some alternative arrangements  in certain circumstances, 
was  prescribed for a stock  more  than 20 % above  the MSY  stock 
level,  termed  an  “initial  management  stock.” A stock  more  than 
10% below  the  MSY  stock  level  was  designated a “protection 
stock,” and no commercial  whaling  was  permitted on such a 
stock in order to allow  the  maximum rate of recovery  towards 
the MSY level (IWC, 1977). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MANAGEMENT 
The  difficulties  associated  with  the New Management 
Procedure for commercial  whaling  have  been  well  documented 
in the reports of the IWC  Scientific  Committee,  leading  to the 
extensive efforts under way to develop revised procedures. 
Unfortunately,  although  the  procedure  looked  very attractive 
in principle, the  Scientific  Committee  found  that  full  imple- 
mentation was difficult. Problems arose from the fact that 
estimating the MSY, the stock level at which the MSY can 
be taken (MSYL), and the initial level prior to the start of 
exploitation turned out not to be simple tasks. Even when 
estimates of these  values  were  made for a particular stock, the 
changes in estimates  as  they  were  updated  annually  often  led 
to  wide  fluctuations in  catch limits, especially for stocks 
estimated  to  be  close  to  the  MSYL.  The  effect  of  these  problems 
was  that  by the  early 1980s the  Scientific  Committee  found  it 
almost  impossible to reach  agreement on any  recommendations 
for the classification or catch  limits  of  stocks  subject to 
commercial  whaling,  other than those  for  protection stocks. This 
was an  important  factor  in  the 1982 decision of the  commission 
to implement a pause in commercial whaling in effect from 
the 1986 season (Kirkwood, 1992). 
The Revised Management Procedure 
In 1982 the  IWC  adopted a proposal to include  in  the  Schedule 
to the Convention the following, which had the effect of 
instituting at least a temporary  pause  in  commercial  whaling 
(commonly  known  as the “moratorium”): 
. . . catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of 
whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 
pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision  will 
be kept  under  review,  based  upon  the  best  scientific  advice,  and 
by 1990  at  the  latest  the  Commission  will  undertake  a  compre- 
hensive  assessment of the  effects of this decision  on  whale  stocks 
and  consider  modification of this provision  and  the  establishment 
of other  catch  limits [IWC, 1983:21]. 
The  IWC  then  embarked on the  process  that  came  to be known 
as  the  “comprehensive  assessment” of whale  stocks.  This was 
defined by the  scientists  as  an  in-depth  evaluation of the  status 
and trends of all whale stocks in the light of management 
objectives  and procedures. As a direct result of this initiative 
five alternative management procedures were developed by 
individuals or pairs of scientists and tested by a series of 
simulation trials. The  purpose of this exercise was  to overcome 
the  difficulties  identified  with  the  existing procedure, which  is 
tied  to  the  concept  of MSY and a need to have  estimates  of initial 
and current population sizes as well as the series of other 
parameters necessary to  determine  the  population  trajectory  and 
MSY level. 
An account of the  meetings  and  studies up  to 1989, together 
with  some  of the  early  work  undertaken in  this enterprise, has 
been  published  (Donovan, 1989). This covers the  initial 
consideration of  scientific  aspects  of  simulation  and  theoretical 
studies  of alternative management  strategies, as well as  descrip- 
tions  of  the  various  management  procedures  under  development. 
It became clear at an early stage from the amount of work 
involved  in this process  of  testing  and  development  that  any  new 
procedure  could not be ready  by the original deadline of 1990. 
However,  through the work of the individual  developers  and 
their consultations  and  comparisons,  these  proposals  came to 
the point where at its 1991 annual meeting the Scientific 
Committee  (with a minority  dissenting)  recommended  that  the 
commission  adopt  one procedure (known as  the “C” procedure, 
after its developer Dr. Justin  Cooke)  as  suitable for implemen- 
tation  as  replacement for the 1975 procedure (IWC, 1992b). 
The  commission  formally  adopted this procedure  with  some 
modifications  as  the core single  stock  management  procedure 
for baleen  whales  upon  which further development  shall 
proceed.  The  Scientific  Committee was charged  with the task 
of  providing further advice on the  minimum  standards for data, 
including coverage and methodology for sighting surveys, 
analytical  techniques,  and  acceptable  levels of precision. It also 
has to address the development of multistock management 
procedures, based on the modified core procedure (IWC, 
1992a). This work will be undertaken by the 1992 annual 
meeting of the commission, at which there will be some 
possibility of  catch  limits other than zero being  set for certain 
stocks  that  have  been  the  subject of the comprehensive 
assessment  process. 
The C Procedure 
The aim of the C procedure  is  to  provide a reasonable  balance 
between  conservation  and  exploitation of  baleen  whales  and to 
provide a simple  and  convenient  method for determining  catch 
limits  with  minimal  requirements for data. With respect to con- 
servation, it aims to  ensure  that  depleted  stocks are rehabilitated 
and  that  stocks  that are only  lightly  depleted to date are not 
reduced  to  below  half their initial  abundance.  With  respect  to 
exploitation, it  places greater weight on guaranteeing at least 
some  catch in  all  cases  where appropriate, rather than  trying 
to  obtain a high  but  unreliable  catch  level  in  only  some  cases 
(Kirkwood, 1992). 
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To determine catch limits each main region, such as the 
Antarctic, North Atlantic, or North Pacific, is divided into 
appropriate sub-areas.  The  input  data  required are one or more 
estimates of absolute  abundance  derived  from  sightings  surveys 
and all previous  known  catches  in  the  sub-area by year. A very 
simplified  population  model is fitted to these data. The  model 
has  only  two  estimatable  parameters - one  relating  to overall 
stock  size  and  the other relating to relative stock  productivity. 
By fitting the model to the data, estimates of the current 
abundance,  maximum  sustainable  exploitation rate, and  stock 
depletion  relative to the  unexploited  level are obtained.  Nominal 
catch  limits are related  to  these  quantities by a simple formula. 
The  nominal  catch limit, as a proportion of current stock size, 
is zero when the stock is depleted  to  less  than 50% of the initial 
level. For stocks  above  this  level the limit  varies  linearly  with 
the  estimated  stock  depletion,  rising  to  one-and-a-half  times  the 
estimate of  maximum  sustainable  exploitation  rate  for  stocks 
not depleted at all. The nominal  catch limits do not translate 
directly into  the  actual  catch  limits  to be set, since  the  abundance 
estimates are not exact. A range of nominal catch limits is 
calculated,  along  with the probability of each  value,  and  the 
median of this range  becomes  the  actual  catch  limit. 
After  this core procedure  has  been  applied to each sub-area, 
it is applied to the whole region. If the regional  catch  limit 
exceeds  the  sum of the  sub-area limits, then  neither  the  sub- 
area nor the  regional  catch  limits may be exceeded.  Catch  limits 
are recalculated  each  year  that new abundance  data  become 
available, except  that  the  time  between  recalculations is never 
less  than  two  years or more  than  six.  The  catch limits remain 
constant until recalculated, unless more than ten years have 
elapsed  since the last survey of abundance,  when a special rule 
comes  into  effect  reducing  the  catch  limit by 20% of  the average 
catch of the  ten  preceding  years  each  year  until  either new data 
are provided or the catch  limit  becomes zero. 
When the  IWC  adopted this model as its  revised  management 
procedure, it imposed a modification that had the effect of 
increasing  the  internal  protection  level  in  the  model to 54 % , and 
it also set the objective of achieving a final  median  population 
size after 100 years of 72 % of the unexploited level. 
RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL  SUBSISTENCE  WHALING 
The first Schedule to the 1946 International  Convention for 
the  Regulation of Whaling  included  as its second  paragraph: 
“It  is forbidden to take or kill  gray  whales or right  whales, 
except  when  the  meat  and  products of such  whales are to  be 
used  exclusively for  local  consumption  by  the  aborigines” P C ,  
1950: 15). This exception clause thus carried forward the 
conceptual  approach  found  in  the  exception  contained  in 
Article 3 of the  International  Convention for the  Regulation of 
Whaling  signed  in  Geneva  in 1931: “The present  Convention 
does not apply to aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the 
territories of the High Contracting Parties provided that - 
1. They  use canoes, pirogues or other  exclusively  native craft 
propelled by oars or sails. 2. They do not carry firearms. 
3. They are not in the employment of persons other than 
aborigines. 4. They are not  under contract to deliver  the  products 
of their whaling to any third person” (Birnie, 1985681-682). 
This  exemption was  not included in the  Whaling  Agreement 
of 1937, which  specifically  prohibited the taking  of  right  whales, 
but  although  the  United  States  signed this treaty, and  Canada 
the 1938 Protocol, aboriginal  whaling for bowheads  continued 
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in  Alaska  (Durham,  1979)  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent  in  Canada 
(Mitchell  and  Reeves,  1982).  Both  Canada  and the U.S. 
were  founder  members  of the IWC,  but  Canada  withdrew  on 
30  June  1982. 
Aboriginal  subsistence  whaling  has  therefore  been  recognized 
by international treaty for 60 years as in some ways being 
different  and  having  a  distinctive  character,  making  it  susceptible 
to other controls than those on the larger-scale commercial 
whaling  operations.  In the 1931  and  1946  agreements  codifying 
the regulations governing the commercial  catching activities, 
aboriginal subsistence  whaling  was  identified  only as exempt 
from the general restrictions and  requirements  spelled out. 
THE BOWHEAD PROBLEM 
At  the  same  time as the  IWC  was  strengthening  its  conservation 
policy by putting into effect in 1975 the new management 
procedure for commercial whaling operations, the Scientific 
Committee  was  expressing  increasing  concern  over the trend 
in the catches of the bowhead whale by Alaskan Eskimos 
(Gambell, 1983). This  eventually  led  to the development  of  a 
specific management  regime for aboriginal subsistence  whale 
fisheries. 
The  people  of these arctic communities  have  a  long  history 
and culture based  upon  the  hunting  of  these whales, but the 
bowhead  numbers  were  severely  depleted  by  commercial 
whaling  activities  (IWC,  1982).  The  commercial  fishery  on  the 
western arctic bowhead  whales started in 1848, when the first 
American  whaling  vessel started pelagic  whaling in the Arctic 
Ocean after working  through the Bering Strait, and  finished 
about  1914  because  of the lack  of  whales  and the collapse of 
the market for the most  important product, the baleen.  There- 
after the native  people  continued their traditional hunt, using 
their old methods and skills, augmented by the 19th-century 
technology  they  had  acquired  from  contact  with  the  commercial 
whalers (Marquette and Bockstoce, 1980). 
The  catches  continued  at  a  modest  level  of  around  12  animals 
landed each year from 1910 to 1969. During the next eight 
years there was  a  significant increase in the catch, averaging 
32 animals  landed  per  year  to  1977  (Marquette  and  Bockstoce, 
1980). This increase in catch was possibly in reaction to 
restrictions  placed  on the take  of  caribou  from the western  arctic 
herd, which  had  declined  sharply  since  1970.  There  was also 
a greater amount  of  money available to support whaling 
activities  in  the  coastal  communities as a  result of the  petroleum 
exploration and extraction opportunities in the area and the 
settlement  of  compensation  claims for land rights. More 
worrying than the increase in the number of whales being 
landed, though, was the fact that the number  of  whales struck 
but  lost,  and  possibly  dying  from  their  injuries,  increased greatly 
from 10 in 1973 to 79 in 1977. This change was probably 
associated  with  a progressive change  from  using  a darting gun 
with line attached  to  a greater reliance on the shoulder gun, 
which  has  no  fixing line and  with  a  poor record with respect 
to bomb  detonation.  Another  major  factor  was  the  increase  in  the 
whaling effort and the associated  number  of relatively 
inexperienced crews. 
Scientific assessments of the size of the bowhead whale 
population  around  Alaska  suggested  that there had  been 11 700 
to 18 000  whales at the initial  level  in 1850, but that the stock 
in 1977  numbered  only 600 to 2000  animals  and  that the kill 
rate of 5 % was increasing (IWC, 1978b). There were also 
concerns over habitat pollution and degradation from the 
development of hydrocarbon  exploration  and extraction 
activities. The  IWC  Scientific  Committee  commented  that the 
reduction  of the bowhead  whale to a  small fraction of its initial 
population  presented  serious  questions  about  its  ability  to  survive 
natural  fluctuations  that  might  reduce  it  below  some  critical  level 
where  extinction  is  likely,  exacerbated  by  continued  exploitation 
and the possibility of natural disasters. Accordingly there 
appeared  to  be  a  clear  scientific  case to be made for a  suspension 
of  catching this species in the hope  that this would  permit the 
stock to recover to a  somewhat safer level (IWC,  1978b). 
The  commission  responded  to this situation  at its June  1977 
annual  meeting  by  deleting the aboriginal  subsistence  exception 
clause for right whales,  thus  banning all hunting  of  bowheads, 
recognized to be the most endangered of the whales (IWC, 
1978a). This was obviously a very drastic measure, but the 
evidence  presented  by  scientists  indicated there was  a real risk 
that the increasing  slaughter  of the whales,  many  of  which  were 
going to waste, would lead to the extinction of the stock in 
the foreseeable future. 
Unfortunately, the concerns that had  been  voiced  over the 
status  and  need for more  information  on the bowhead  whale 
in  the  Scientific  Committee  of  the  IWC  from  1972  onwards  were 
not  conveyed  by  the U.S. government  to  the  Eskimo  people until 
1977. By this time the decision had been made to end the 
bowhead hunt, and the Eskimo whalers reacted quickly by 
forming the Alaska  Eskimo  Whaling  Commission,  composed 
of one  representative of each of the nine  whaling  villages.  Their 
purpose  was  to overturn the ban  on their traditional  subsistence 
hunt  of the bowhead  whale,  to disseminate information on the 
nutritional  and  cultural  significance to the Eskimo  people  of the 
bowhead  whale,  and  to  promote  scientific  research  on  the  whales 
and their abundance (Adams, 1982). 
Through  legal  proceedings  and persistent lobbying, the 
Eskimo  community  persuaded the U.S. government  to  press for 
a  modest take of  bowhead  whales to satisfy their subsistence 
and  cultural  needs. This catch  was to be  coupled  with  a  scientific 
research program  on the whale  stock  and  a series of  regulatory 
measures  intended to reduce the loss rate in the hunt. 
TOWARDS AN ABORIGINAL  SUBSISTENCE  WHALING  POLICY 
The  IWC  was till reluctant to accept the full catch  requested 
by the U.S. on behalf of the Eskimos, since the Scientific 
Committee continued to urge extreme caution in allowing 
any catch. At the 1978 meeting, for example, the Scientific 
Committee had available an improved population estimate 
resulting  from the substantial U.S. research program,  with  an 
estimate  of  2260  bowhead  whales  off the Alaskan coast. This 
figure  was  higher than previous  estimates,  mainly  due  to  a l rge 
increase in survey effort, different environmental conditions, 
and  better  location  of the survey  positions.  However,  the  number 
of  calves  counted led to an estimate of  only 29 calves  in the 
population.  There are difficulties in sighting  calves  and  they 
may be segregated  away  from the main  body  of the migrating 
whales,  but the Scientific  Committee  was  concerned  that the 
normal  recovery process of the stock  may  have  been altered 
and therefore considered that caution was necessary (IWC, 
1979b).  Because  of  the  many  problems  involved,  the  commission 
decided  that  a  special  working  group  should  be  established to 
examine the entire aboriginal whaling problem and develop 
proposals  for  a  regime for the  aboriginal  bowhead  hunt  in  Alaska 
and, if appropriate, a regime or regimes for other aboriginal 
hunts (IWC, 1979a). 
In 1979 the  commission  convened three panels of experts to 
provide  information  to  help  this  Technical  Committee  Working 
Group  in  devising a management  program  that  would  satisfy 
both the hunters  and  the  very  strong  conservation  lobby 
(Gambell, 1982). The panels were concerned with wildlife 
science  and the nutrition  and culture of the aboriginal  peoples. 
The conclusions  drawn  were  that  in  strictly  biological  terms no 
Bering  Sea  bowhead  whales  should  be  hunted if the population 
is to  have  the  best  prospect for recovery. There are a number 
of alternative  sea  mammal  and  other  wildlife  resources  available 
to replace the bowhead whale in the lives of the northwest 
Alaskan  Eskimos.  In  nutritional terms, assuming  replacement 
with foods of equivalent value, the diet of the  Eskimos  would 
not  be  adversely  affected by removing  the  bowhead  from  the 
diet. However, this  change would certainly  have a significant 
impact  on  the culture of  these  whaling  communities.  Any  attempt 
to  introduce controls should  involve  the  local  communities to 
the fullest extent possible to determine their effects and to 
achieve full acceptance (IWC, 1982). 
The  commission  received  and  reviewed  the  report  of  this  panel 
meeting  and  of  the  Technical  Committee  Working Group, which 
had proposed a dual  system of management  involving  research 
and  management  to  be  undertaken by the US. and a schedule 
amendment  that  set a ceiling to any catches  taken. There were 
still considerable  difficulties  in  attempting to reconcile  the  scien- 
tific advice for minimal  catches  and the aboriginal  dependence 
on the catches. A resolution was therefore adopted  stating  that 
the IWC  would  institute a management  regime  taking  account 
of  the  documented  need  of the aborigines  and  the  estimated net 
recruitment of the  whale  stock or, recognizing  the  difficulty in 
estimating  the latter, a percentage of the current population  size 
(IWC, 1980). The  commission  intended  that  the  needs  of  the 
Eskimos  should  be  documented by the U.S. government  based 
on 1) the importance of the bowhead in the traditional diet, 
2) possible  adverse  effects of shifts to non-native foods, 
3) availability  and  acceptability  of other food sources, 
4) historical take, 5) the  integrative  functions of the bowhead 
hunt in contemporary Eskimo society and the risk to the 
community identity from an imposed restriction on native 
harvesting of the bowhead, and 6) to the extent possible, 
ecological  considerations. 
The commission understood that the U.S. would adopt a 
national  management  plan  designed  to  establish  catch  limits  and 
reporting and data requirements, allow for reduction in the 
struck  and  lost  rate,  and  implement  an  appropriate  research  plan. 
In accordance  with this resolution,  the U.S. presented  an  interim 
report  to  the  IWC  in 1980 that  discussed  the historical, cultural, 
and  nutritional  aspects of the bowhead  fishery  and  attempted 
to  quantify  the  needs  of the Eskimos  as  follows  (summarized 
from Donovan, 1982). 
Historic  Need 
The  available  catch  data by village for 1930-69 were  used 
as  the  period  during  which  it  was  considered  that the take of 
bowheads both met Eskimo needs and was not affected by 
external factors. It  was  found  that for the two  villages  where 
sufficient  information was available, there had  been  an  almost 
uniform  decline in the per  capita  whale  catch.  Several  possible 
explanations  were  advanced,  including  the  increasing  availability 
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of other  (non-native)  foods and an  increasing  reliability on a 
cash  economy.  The  report  concluded  that  on  an  historical  basis, 
the  annual  needs  were 19-33 whales. 
Nutritional  need 
The report examined  the  available alternative food sources, 
including other marine mammals, birds, fish, and terrestrial 
mammals, the possible effects on the health of the Eskimo 
population if a shift  in diet to non-native  foods occurred, and 
the food preferences of the  Eskimos  themselves.  The  conclusion 
was that 32-33 whales per year were needed to maintain a 
proportional  share of  the  subsistence  diet  in  accord  with  the  share 
in 1969. 
Cultural  Need 
In  attempting to quantify  the size of  any catch  required  on 
cultural grounds, it was  noted  that the wide  fluctuations  in  the 
historic catch had not changed the Eskimo culture and that 
indeed  they  were  part of that culture. The culture was  based 
on the opportunity to hunt, to participate in  whaling activities, 
and not just the number of whales landed. It was therefore 
difficult to calculate a catch on the basis of cultural needs. 
Nonetheless, after making  assumptions  that the catch  per  crew 
is an important cultural measure of the hunt, that the 1960s 
provide a base  period  when cultural needs  were met, and  that 
there were  good  data for three villages  and  the  recent historical 
catches  in  the  other  villages  satisfied  the  needs,  it  was  concluded 
that 18-22 whales  were  required to satisfy  the cultural needs. 
The U.S. stated that the cultural need  had the greatest 
significance  to the community,  but  initially  the  IWC  was  unable 
to agree on a catch  limit for 1981 taking  account of these  needs 
and the biological evidence. Eventually a compromise was 
adopted  whereby a block  quota for the three years 1981-83 was 
set  of 45 whales  landed  and 65 struck, provided  that in  any one 
year the  number of whales  landed  should  not  exceed 17 (IWC, 
198  1). The U . S . indicated  that  the  catch  would  be  progressively 
reduced  within  these figures during  the period. 
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR 
ABORIGINAL  SUBSISTENCE  WHALING 
In 1980 the commission  noted  that  the  question f aboriginal 
subsistence  whaling was assuming  increasing  importance in its 
discussions and agreed that it would be helpful to develop 
appropriate management principles and guidelines for sub- 
sistence  catches parallel to those  reflected in the commission’s 
management for commercial  whaling. It therefore established 
a Working Group of the Technical Committee, including 
representatives of  that  committee,  the  Scientific  Committee,  and 
the indigenous people who take subsistence catches (IWC, 
1981). The  working  group met in 1981 immediately before the 
annual  meeting of the  commission,  and its report  included a 
number of important concepts (summarized from Donovan, 
1982) as follows. 
Dejnitions 
Aborigirial  subsistence  whaling means  whaling for purposes 
of local  aboriginal  consumption carried out by or on  behalf  of 
aboriginal, indigenous, or native peoples who share strong 
community, familial, social, and cultural ties related to a 
continuing  traditional  dependence  on  whaling  and  on the use 
of  whales. 
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Local  consumption means the traditional uses of whale 
products by  local  aboriginal,  indigenous, or native  communities 
in  meeting their nutritional, subsistence, and cultural require- 
ments.  The  term  includes trade in  items that are by-products 
of  subsistence catches. 
Subsistence catches are catches of whales by aboriginal 
subsistence whaling operations. 
Management Principles for Aboriginal Whaling 
The  following  broad  objectives  were  agreed on: to  ensure  that 
the risks of extinction to individual stocks are not seriously 
increased by  subsistence  whaling; to enable aboriginal people 
to  harvest  whales  in  perpetuity at levels appropriate to their 
cultural and nutritional requirements, subject to the other 
objectives;  to  maintain  the  status of the  whale  stocks  at or above 
the level giving the highest  net recruitment and to ensure that 
stocks below that level are moved towards it, so far as the 
environment permits. 
THE IWC MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE FOR 
ABORIGINAL  SUBSISTENCE  WHALING 
The report mentioned  above  was  forwarded to the member 
governments  of the IWC for consideration  and  comment during 
the following year. As  a result, at the 1982  annual  meeting  a 
resolution was adopted agreeing to implement an aboriginal 
subsistence whaling  regime  in  order to achieve the objectives 
set  out  in the report. It recognized  that the full  participation  and 
cooperation of the affected aboriginal peoples are essential for 
effective whale  management.  A  standing  sub-committee  of the 
Technical  Committee  was  established to consider  documentation 
on nutritional, subsistence, and cultural needs  relating to 
aboriginal  subsistence  whaling  and the uses  of  whales  taken for 
such  purposes  and  to  provide  advice  to  the  Technical  Committee 
for its consideration  and  determination  of appropriate manage- 
ment measures (IWC, 1983). 
A  proposal  on  management  was  developed  and  adopted as 
an  amendment  to the schedule to the convention  in  the  following 
terms: 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 10 [which sets 
out the  management  principles  for  commercial  whaling],  catch 
limits for aboriginal subsistence  need  for  the  1984 whaling season 
and each whaling season thereafter shall be established in 
accordance with the  following principles: 
(1) For stocks at or above the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) level,  aboriginal  subsistence  catches hall be permitted 
so long as total removals do not exceed 90 per  cent of MSY. 
(2) For stocks below the MSY level but above a certain minimum 
level, aboriginal subsistence  catches shall be permitted so long 
as they  are  set at levels which will allow whale  stocks to move 
to the MSY level.* 
(3) The  above  provisions will be kept  under  review, based upon 
the  best  scientific  advice,  and by 1990  at  he  latest the 
Commission wili undertake  a  comprehensive  assessment of the 
effects of these provisions on whale stocks, and consider 
modifications. 
*The Commission, on advice of the Scientific Committee, shall establish 
as far as possible (a)  a minimum stock level for each stock below which 
whales shall not be taken, and (b) a rate of increase towards the MSY 
level for each stock. The Scientific Committee shall advise on a minimum 
stock level and on a range of rates of increase towards the MSY level 
under different catch regimes [IWC, 1983:40]. 
The stocks to which these provisions applied, in addition  to 
the  Bering  Sea  stock  of  bowhead  whales,  were  humpback  whales 
in  Greenland waters, provided  that  whale catchers of less than 
50 gross register  tonnage are used for this purpose;  gray  whales 
from the eastern stock in the North Pacific; and  minke  and fin 
whales  from the West  Greenland stocks of these species. 
These  catches are permitted  only  when the meat  and  products 
are used exclusively for local consumption. The Greenland 
humpback  whale provision for whales  not  below  35  feet 
(10.7 m) in length was progressively reduced in subsequent 
years and  finally  withdrawn altogether in  1985  because  of the 
Scientific  Committee’s  advice  that no catch  should  be  permitted 
from the West  Greenland  feeding  aggregation  of  about  200-300 
animals  (IWC,  1986). It should be noted  that the U.S.S.R. had 
overcome  high loss rates in its aboriginal fishery  by  providing 
a  special catcher that  replaced aboriginal methods  of  hunting 
(IWC, 1978b). This is reflected in the schedule to the 
convention  where the taking of gray  whales  from the eastern 
stock  in the North Pacific is permitted, but  only  by aborigines 
or a contracting government on behalf  of aborigines. In 1987 
the commission also accepted the aboriginal subsistence nature 
of  humpback  whale fishery by the Bequians  of St. Vincent  and 
the  Grenadines  and  regularized  its  status  by  incorporating  a  catch 
limit in the schedule to the convention  (IWC, 1988a). 
REVIEW OF THE ABORIGINAL SUBSISTENCE 
WHALING PROCEDURE 
In  1983 the Scientific  Committee  noted  that  a  minimum  stock 
level  would  be  difficult  to  establish for any  individual  stock  in 
the present state of  knowledge  but that it might  be  possible to 
advise on a  general  level  below  which  any  stock  should  not  fall. 
Discussion centred on how  such  a level might  be  determined 
and  also the related  question  of  maintenance  of  adequate  genetic 
diversity  necessary for the evolutionary survival of the stock. 
Important factors for population  recovery are the age  and sex 
structure of the population  and the degree of  density-dependent 
response.  The  best  indication  of the “plasticity” of  mysticete 
populations  in  terms  of their ability  to recover from  low levels 
brought  about  by  exploitation  by man is  the  known  record.  Some 
stocks  appear to be able to  increase  from  levels  even  below  500 
an imals ,  but the level  to  which  other  stocks  that  do  not  at  present 
show  evidence  of  recovery  may  have been reduced is unknown. 
The  committee  concluded  that the consideration  of  a  “minimum 
level” above  which  recovery  can  be  assumed or predicted to 
occur  cannot  be  adequately  addressed  given the present state 
of knowledge (IWC, 1984). 
The  Scientific  committee has given  essentially  similar  expres- 
sion to its views in succeeding years that the minimum level 
is unknown,  but that even so a  population  was  believed  to  be 
above that level or that a current population is above the size 
of other populations  known to be increasing (Donovan,  1991). 
The  Scientific  Committee also considered the question  of rates 
of increase in 1983, There is evidence  that the Eastern Pacific 
gray  whale  has  increased  at  a r te of 3.7 % per  annum  and  that 
right  whales off both  Argentina  and  South  Africa are increasing 
at  about  7 % annually. It proposed  that  advice  to  the  commission 
could  include  information on the  probability  that  net  recruitment 
exceeds K/(l-f) for various values of the kill (K) and the 
fraction (f) allocated to rebuilding the stock towards MSY 
(IWC, 1984). 
While this appeared to be a useful  concept  where  values of 
the necessary parameters are available,  it  has  never been applied 
in  practice  (Donovan, 1991). However, a range of  replacement 
yields for various MSY rates for bowhead  whales  based on a 
simulation exercise has  been presented, with  the  comment  that 
for the  population to increase, the  catches  should be less  than 
the replacement yield (IWC, 1988b,  1989). 
In 1990 the  Scientific  Committee  commented  that  it had  not 
been  able to determine  minimum  stock  levels for each  stock 
subject to aboriginal subsistence whaling and has had great 
difficulty  in  establishing rates of increase for all  but  the  gray 
whale and, in recent years, the  bowhead  whale.  It noted the 
similarity  between  the  management  schemes  for  commercial  and 
aboriginal  subsistence  whaling, in  that  hey  both require 
estimates of the MSY and  the MSY level  and rate. The main 
difference  between  them is the  protection  level. It was  assumed 
that  any  revised  procedure for commercial  whaling would  be 
generally  compatible  with  that  for  aboriginal  subsistence  whaling 
and  that a full  discussion  of  any  new  scheme  for  the latter could 
only  usefully  take  place after an  alternative  management 
procedure  for  commercial  whaling had been established 
(IWC, 1991b). 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, SOVEREIGNTY, 
AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
The United  Nations  Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, I982 
The most far-reaching development in recent years with 
respect to sovereignty  and  freedom of access in the  world’s 
oceans is the United  Nations  Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). The many  years of negotiations  among  govern- 
ments  in  that  forum  meant  that there was a continuing  delay 
in taking  action on a number of questions  raised in the IWC, 
especially  concerning the revision of the 1946 convention  and 
the problems of competence  over  the  species  covered by the 
convention  and  coastal  state  jurisdiction.  Although  the  UNCLOS 
is not  yet in force, its provisions  have  come  to  be  accepted  as 
customary  law and normative  in  most areas of marine affairs. 
The United Nations began addressing the issues of over- 
exploitation of the living resources of the  seas  in 1967 when 
the  concept  of  common  heritage -the  idea  that  the  seas  belong 
to all nations - was first introduced into this international 
forum, although  the  context was more  specifically the sea bed 
and ocean floor  (Zuleta, 1983). After a long  negotiating  process, 
UNCLOS  was  finally  adopted  as a package  proposal  consisting 
of 320 articles in 17 parts  and was signed by 159 states at the 
conclusion of the third conference in 1982. It will  come  into 
force when 60 countries have  ratified  it. 
Of  primary  significance  is  the  principle  of  the  sovereign  rights 
of coastal  states  within their 200 nautical  mile  exclusive 
economic  zone (EEZ) and  the  objective set out  in  Article 62 
of optimum  utilization of the  living resources within  that  zone. 
All  states  have a duty to ensure the conservation of the  living 
resources of the  sea  and to cooperate with  other  states  in so 
doing. Marine mammals are recognized  as  one of the species 
of the  living  resources  to  which a special  regime applies, and 
this is reflected in Article 65, which specifically notes that 
nothing restricts the  right of a coastal  state or the  competence 
of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, 
limit, or regulate  the  exploitation of marine mammals more 
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strictly  than  otherwise provided. States are also to cooperate 
with a view  to  the  conservation of marine  mammals  and  in  the 
case of  cetaceans shall in particular  work  through  the  appropriate 
international  organizations for their  conservation,  management, 
and  study. 
Particularly  relevant  here is the  fact  that here  is no recognition 
in  the  UNCLOS  text of  the right of an international  organization 
to infringe on the sovereignty of a coastal  state  in  its  exclusive 
economic zone. It may be noted that the 1946 International 
Convention for the  Regulation of Whaling  applies to all waters 
in  which  whaling is prosecuted by factory ships, land stations, 
and  whale catchers under  the jurisdiction of the  contracting 
governments (Article I, Paragraph 2). There is thus a possible 
tension  between  these  two treaties in  this area. 
Some  member  nations  of  the  IWC  with a recent  history of 
commercial  whaling,  notably  Iceland  and  Norway,  have  stated 
in  recent  meetings  of  the  commission  that  since  that  body  seems 
reluctant to allow  the  resumption of commercial  whaling,  it 
might  be  necessary for them to turn  to  alternative fora where 
the  issues of  catch limits can be discussed (WC, 1991a). Iceland 
has  subsequently  given  formal  notice of its  withdrawal  from 
the  convention  effective 30 June 1992. In  this  context  the  newly 
established North Atlantic Committee for Cooperation on 
Research on Marine  Mammals,  comprising  overnment 
representatives  from  the Faroe Islands,  Greenland,  Iceland,  and 
Norway, is relevant.  The  UNCLOS  text  does  not  specify  which 
international  body, or even if there is to be  only  one  body, is 
the appropriate organization  through  which  coastal  states are 
to cooperate  with  respect to the management  and  conservation 
of the whale resources. Certainly  the  precedent for regional 
bodies to oversee the whaling activities of coastal states in 
particular parts of the  world is not  new.  The  governments  of 
Chile, Ecuador, and  Peru  formed  the  Permanent  Commission 
of the  Conference on the Use  and  Conservation of the Marine 
Resources of the South  Pacific  in 1952. They established  catch 
regulations  broadly  similar to those in force for  the  IWC at that 
time.  Subsequently all those  governments  have joined the IWC 
- Chile  and  Peru  in 1979, and  Ecuador in 199 1. 
U. S. Legislation 
The  U.S.  has a number  of  pieces of domestic  legislation  that 
have had some  influence on the  implementation  and  enforcement 
of  IWC  decisions.  In particular, the Pelly  Amendment of 1971 
to the 1%5 Fishermen’s  Protective  Act  and  the 1979 Packwood- 
Magnuson  Amendment to the  Fishery  Conservation  and 
Management  Act  of 1976 both require the US. Secretary of 
Commerce  to  assess if a foreign state is carrying out activities 
that diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery 
conservation  agreement o which the U . S . is a party, including 
the 1946 International  Convention for the  Regulation of 
Whaling. If that is the determination, then the government is 
certified  under  the  U.S. legislation, with  the result that there 
is an  automatic  reduction  in  the  fishery  quota  of  the  foreign  state 
in  U.S.  waters  under  the  Packwood-Magnuson  Amendment, 
and the Pelly Amendment authorizes the imposition of an 
embargo  on the importation of fish products  from  the  foreign 
state  into  the  U.S.  (Birnie, 1985). These  legislative  instruments 
have been used, or their use  has  been threatened, to persuade 
non-member  whaling  nations to join the  IWC  and therefore be 
bound by IWC decisions. They have also had the effect of 
encouraging  compliance by the affected  member  nations  with 
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IWC  recommendations  and  resolutions  that are essentially of 
a non-binding nature, such  as  those  dealing  with  special  permit 
catches of whales for purposes of scientific research under 
Article VI11  of the convention  (such  special  permit  catches are 
exempt  from  the  operations of the convention). 
This  application of the  domestic  legislation of one  nation to 
bring  about  the  compliance  of  other  governments  with  restrictive 
regulations  that  the  latter  would  not  otherwise  accept  has  caused 
considerable  concern to the  affected parties. It  has also caused 
serious diplomatic  disputes  between  the  U.S.  on the one hand 
and Iceland, Japan, and Norway on the other directly in the 
whaling  context.  Additionally,  Mexico has  complained  that  the 
use  of  the  Pelly  Amendment to exclude  its  tuna  from  the U.S. 
market, because of the high incidental catch of dolphins 
associated with it, is in contravention of the 1947 General 
Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT). An adjudication  on 
this  matter  that  found in favour of  Mexico  could  have further 
ramifications in the  whole  field of ocean  resource  management. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In recent years there has been a shift of emphasis in the 
discussion  of  the  management  of  the natural resource  represented 
by the  whale  stocks of the world. When the 1946 convention 
was formulated  and  signed  the  balance of interests among  the 
member  states  was  very  much  on  the  si&  of  industrial  utilization. 
Any disagreement  on  the size of  the  quotas  nearly  always  was 
resolved in favour of the  whaling industry. Particularly  during 
the past  two  decades there has  been a heightened  awareness of 
the  vulnerability  of  the  whales to overexploitation demonstrated 
by better  scientific  understanding  and  more  exact  mathematical 
analysis.  There  has  also  been  much greater public  awareness 
of the whole  question of environmental conservation, in  which 
the  whale has  come to assume a symbolic  as  well  as  an  actual 
leading role. As a result of these  changing  perceptions of  how 
natural  renewable  resources  should  be  managed  and  utilized,  the 
question  has  been  raised of whether or not the 1946 convention 
should  be  revised  to  take  account  of  these  new  concerns. 
So far the convention  has  been  viewed  and  interpreted  as a 
sufficiently flexible instrument to accommodate the revised 
approaches  to  management  and  protection ow current. As  an 
example, the 1982 decision  to  adopt the moratorium on 
commercial  whaling  effective from the 1986 season was taken 
without regard to the requirement contained in Article V, 
Paragraph 2, of the convention, which stipulates that such 
amendments to the schedule should be based on scientific 
fmdings  and  take  into  consideration  the intemts of  the  consumers 
of  the  whale  products.  In the present  climate of environmental 
awareness, the  commission is acting  in a way that  reflects  the 
views  of  the  majority  of  its  members andexercising  the  so-called 
“precautionary  principle”  of  management.  Under this approach, 
the  burden of proof  has  been  moved  to  those  who  wish to utilize 
the  resource  to  demonstrate  that any  resumption  of  whaling  will 
not  be  harmful. This policy is most  likely to prevent a repetition 
of the  successive  depletion of one  whale  species  and  stock  after 
another, which  has  been  the  pattern  of  the  industry over the 
centuries. It does  make  it  extremely difficult, though, for any 
nation  wishing  to  resume  catching  operations  on  those  stocks 
that are widely  recognized to be  sufficiently large and  capable 
of sustaining a carefully  controlled  and  monitored  harvest. 
The  first  international  treaty to provide any sort of regulation 
and  limitation to commercial  whaling operations, formulated 
in 193 1, specifically  made  exemptions  for  whaling  by  aboriginal 
peoples for  their  subsistence  purposes.  The  present 1946 
International  Convention  for  the  Regulation  of  Whaling  contains 
in its schedule a number of paragraphs  that  apply  specifically 
to  aboriginal  subsistence  whaling,  clearly  indicating  that this 
category  of  activity  is  identifiably different  from  the  commercial 
whaling  operations.  These  provisions  have been  developed  and 
added to over the years as the need arose, and generally in 
response to specific whale-hunting operations. Thus special 
provision  was  made for  Greenlanders  in 1961 to take  humpback 
whales  using  vessels  of  less  than 50 tons,  even  though  humpback 
whaling in the North Atlantic by commercial vessels was 
prohibited. At the  same  meeting the season for minke  whaling 
off Greenland was extended  from 6 to 8 months,  and  the  use 
of a land  station  for  treating  the  whales  was  not  required  (IWC, 
1962). Then in 1964 an  amendment  to  the  schedule  was  adopted 
to ensure that  gray  and  right  whales  could  only  be  taken by 
aboriginal peoples, or on their behalf, when the meat and 
products are to be  used  exclusively for local  consumption by 
those  people. This was  to  avoid abuse of  the  rights  of  aborigines 
by commercial interests (IWC, 1966b). 
Subsequently  the  International  Whaling  Commission  has  had 
to formulate specific management procedures for aboriginal 
subsistence  whaling  operations.  This arose from  the particular 
case of the Alaskan  Eskimo  bowhead  hunt  when the scientific 
evidence  appeared  to  indicate  that  that  stock of whales  was  in 
dire need  of  total protection  from  all  forms of hunting. As a 
result of the  consultations  and  meetings  that  took  place,  s ries 
of criteria for the  regulation  and control of aboriginal  whale 
hunts  was established.  Perhaps  the  most  significant of these  was 
the  recognition for the  fullest  possible  participation by the  local 
people  affected  in the decision-making  process  and  their  full 
involvement  in  the  implementation  of  the  agreed  regulations  and 
controls.  The  current  regulations  unfortunately  request  scientific 
input  that is not  within our grasp to provide, and  the  procedure 
presently  followed  in  practice  places  the  primary  determination 
of  catch levels on the perceived  subsistence need  of the  local 
human populations, with rather little weight attached to the 
biological  capacity of the  whale  stock to sustain  that  amount 
of catch. 
The development of revised management procedures for 
commercial  whaling now under way  in the  IWC may  lead to 
the  revision of the  procedures for aboriginal  subsistence 
whaling. It would at all  events  be  good for a more  practical 
procedure to be  developed  that  takes  account of all  the  relevant 
factors,  both  with  respect o the  status  of  the stocks of  the  whales 
themselves  and  to  the  subsistence  needs  of  the  aboriginal  hunters 
and  their  communities. 
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